The effects of the new fiscal rule and creative accounting: Empirical evidence from Japanese municipalities by Hirota, Haruaki & Yunoue, Hideo
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
The effects of the new fiscal rule and
creative accounting: Empirical evidence
from Japanese municipalities
Haruaki Hirota and Hideo Yunoue
Musashi University, University of Hyogo
20 June 2017
Online at https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/79812/
MPRA Paper No. 79812, posted 21 June 2017 04:43 UTC
The eects of the new scal rule and creative
accounting: Empirical evidence from Japanese
municipalities 
Haruaki Hirota y Hideo Yunoue z
June 21, 2017
Abstract
The purpose of this paper is to analyze creative accounting by stock-
ow adjustment in Japanese municipalities after the introduction of
a new scal rule. We contribute to the literature by analyzing the
interdependency of the new scal indexes, which comprise three ow
indexes and one stock index. Our main contribution is the nding
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they decreased their ow indexes by reducing reserved funds to avoid
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scal rule, as the stock index criterion
is weaker than that of the three ow indexes.
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1 Introduction
Previous studies have shown that scal policy encouraging issuance of gov-
ernment bonds tends to expand scal decits due to political inuences.
Alesina and Perotti (1996) argue that the expansion of the scal decit has
been caused by a lack of specic scal rules or the low transparency of bud-
get institutions. Many studies have shown the relationship between scal
rules and scal decits and have revealed that scal decits are likely to be
small when scal rules are strict 1. However, some studies have noted that
scal decits may increase when scal rules are suddenly changed or the
transparency of the budget institution is decreased, even when scal rules
are strict. Tanaka (2011) indicated that scal decits could be reduced in
support of scal discipline through the introduction of scal rules before
budgets are drafted.
However, previous studies have indicated that even if scal rules have
a strong eect on improving scal conditions, introducing too strict s-
cal rules may result in the use of scal gimmicks. Milesi - Ferretti (2003)
conducted a theoretical analysis suggesting that scal gimmicks can easily
result when introducing scal rules under scal institutions with low trans-
parency. Koen and van den Noord (2005) pointed out that scal gimmicks
can be categorized into two groups: The rst group includes one-o mea-
sures that aect government net lending or borrowing for a few years but
not permanently. The second group includes creative accounting measures
that aect scal decits or public debts but not net worth. Moreover, von
Hagen and Wol (2006) dened creative accounting as stock-ow adjust-
ments. Stock-ow adjustments mean that SFA = Bt-Bt 1-Dt, in which the
debt level at time t, Bt, should be the debt level from the last year minus the
current scal decit, Dt. These authors showed that there is a tendency to
increase accumulated debts when stock variables are larger than the increase
in scal decits. These results were presented as ow variables using EU
country data. Maltritz and Wuste (2015) showed an eect for scal rules
and stock-ow adjustments using data from 27 countries in the EU. The au-
thors indicated that scal decits were increased by stock-ow adjustments.
Clemenceau and Soguel (2017) showed that creative accounting is mainly
implemented to hide surpluses by using Swiss canton-level data regardless
of the nance minister's personal or ideological background. Moreover, they
revealed that strict scal rules lead nance ministers towards more surplus-
hiding accounting. Although the denition of scal gimmicks varies slightly,
previous studies are clear that scal gimmicks aect the scal decits and
scal discipline of central governments.
1Eichengreen and Bayoumi (1994), von Hagen and Harden (1995), Kontopoulos and
Perotti (1999), Persson and Tabellini (1999), Kirchgussner (2002), von Hagen (2006),
Beetsma et al. (2007), Debrun et al. (2008), Beetsma et al. (2009), Debrun et al. (2009),
Luechinger and Schaltegger (2013), Chatagny (2015).
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However, most previous studies in this area have been conducted us-
ing country- or state-level data from places like the US, EU, OECD, Latin
American countries and Swiss cantons 2. As far as we know, there has been
no empirical research focused on stock-ow adjustments for local govern-
ments, especially municipal-level data, after the introduction of new scal
rules.
In this paper, we analyze creative accounting by stock-ow adjustment
in Japanese municipalities by estimating the interdependency of the new
scal indexes after the introduction of a new scal rule in Japan in FY2008.
The Law Relating to the Financial Soundness of Local Governments [Chiho
zaisei kenzenka ho in Japanese] was enacted in June 2007 in Japan and has
been enforced for all municipalities since the settlement of FY2008 scal
accounts in order to solve serious scal decits. The law introduces four
scal indexes comprising three ow indexes and one stock index. These new
indexes target not only the general accounts of each municipality but also
those of extra-governmental organizations to reveal the true scal conditions
of all public sector entities. Before the introduction of the new scal rule,
the scal management of all municipalities had been conducted under the
previous rule for approximately 50 years. However, because the former rule
included only one of the indexes relating to real decit of general accounts
as a target, some were easily able to shift a portion of the scal decits of
their general accounts to extra-governmental organizations to hide bad scal
conditions. The new scal rule was introduced in FY2008 to address this
problem.
We contribute to the literature in a number of ways. To reveal the true
scal conditions of each municipality, including extra-governmental orga-
nizations, after the introduction of the new scal rule, it is necessary to
investigate the impacts of the new scal rule and to determine whether
municipalities employed creative accounting by stock-ow adjustment. In
addition to assessing previous studies in the literature, we analyze the in-
terdependency of four scal indexes to reveal stock-ow adjustments after
the implementation of the new scal rule using a Seemingly Unrelated Re-
gression (SUR) model and cross-sectional data on all municipalities. The
reasons are as follows.
First, the three ow indexes have both "yellow cards", in which munici-
palities have to plan for early nancial soundness, and "red cards", in which
municipalities have to be under the control of the central government to
rebuild stable nancial conditions. The stock index does not include a red
card. Thus, some municipalities that suer from large scal decits may
have an incentive to create stock-ow adjustments to avoid scal manage-
ment under the surveillance of the central government. In other words, there
is a possibility that these municipalities will have to decrease their ow in-
2See, Maltritz and Wuste (2015)
3
dexes while ignoring increasing the stock index, which does not include a
red card.
Second, we believe that Japanese scal institutions adopt the single an-
nual budget principle, in which the expenditures for each scal year must be
nanced by the revenue within that scal year. For example, if municipali-
ties do not spend all of their budgets within the scal year, their grants from
the central government can later be reduced. As a result, public investments
have a tendency to increase at the end of each scal year. The four new
indexes of the new scal rule must be applied annually. When at least one
index exceeds the red card criterion, municipalities must enter the surveil-
lance of the central government. Thus, municipalities must simultaneously
improve all indexes every year except for the stock index. In this case, when
we estimate these indexes as dependent variables, it is inappropriate to ex-
pect the estimation equation error terms to be uncorrelated. Since these
indexes have contemporaneous cross-equation error correlations, we should
apply an SUR model, which is dierent from the methods applied by previ-
ous studies, including von Hagen and Wol (2006) and Maltritz and Wuste
(2015).
As mentioned above, focusing on the new scal indexes and applying the
SUR model allows us to investigate creative accounting by stock-ow adjust-
ment in Japan after the introduction of the new scal rule. Specically, we
can statistically consider the contemporaneous error terms to deal with es-
timation biases relating to the decisions of municipal scal management.
Additionally, we can practically consider the scal relationships within the
public sector, such as general accounts, public enterprise accounts, local
public corporations, and third sector enterprises.
This paper is structured as follows. Section 2 explains the new scal
rule in Japan. Section 3 explains the empirical method. Section 4 provides
a detailed summary of the data. Section 5 presents and discusses the re-
sults, especially the correlation among the new four indexes, and Section 6
concludes.
2 Institutional background and the new scal rule
for local governments in Japan
2.1 Institutional background
In this section, we briey describe the institutional background of Japanese
local public nance and the new scal rule. Local governments play an im-
portant role in providing public services, including school education, welfare,
public health, re services, public construction, and waste disposal. The pro-
portion of local public nance relative to the gross domestic expenditure is
approximately 11 percent, which is approximately three times larger than
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that of the central government. The Japanese government comprises cen-
tral, prefectural, and municipal governments (ordinance-designated cities,
core cities, special cities, cities, towns, and villages). Ordinance-designated
cities are those with a population of 500,000 or more and are designated by
a cabinet order under a provision. Such cities have nearly the same level of
authority and nancial resources as prefectures. Core cities are those with
a population size of at least 300,000, and parts of their authority are del-
egated by prefectures, though the scope of their authority is smaller than
that of ordinance-designated cities. Similarly, special case cities are those
with a population size of at least 200,000, and parts of their of authority are
delegated by prefectures, though the scope of their authority is smaller than
that of core cities. Cities are dened as having a population size of at least
50,000; however, there is little or no dierence in authority between cities,
towns, and villages.
Normally, the accounts of municipalities are divided into general ac-
counts and special accounts in public nance. Special accounts consist of
public enterprise accounts, such as those for transport businesses, electric-
ity businesses, gas businesses, and residential land development projects.
However, because each municipality provides dierent services depending
on the local conditions, there are dierent types of special accounts. To
compare the accounts of all municipalities uniformly, the Japanese central
government establishes ordinary accounts that cover general accounts and
a common component of special accounts. Thus, we can elucidate the s-
cal conditions of municipalities and conduct a statistical comparison among
municipalities using ordinary accounts and other public enterprise accounts.
Municipalities include some extra-governmental organizations, includ-
ing partial administrative associations, wide-area local public bodies, local
public corporations, and third-sector enterprises. Partial administrative as-
sociations and wide-area local public bodies are extra-governmental orga-
nizations that cooperate with neighboring municipalities to provide public
services, including re rescue, waste removal services, and public long-term
care insurance. Partial administrative associations provide a single service in
cooperation with neighboring municipalities. Wide-area local public bodies
provide multiple services in cooperation with neighboring municipalities.
2.2 The new scal rule for local governments in Japan
To improve scal conditions and work towards a high level of transparency
in scal management, the central government enacted The Law Relating to
the Financial Soundness of Local Governments for local governments. The
new scal rule has been enforced for all municipalities since the settlement
of FY2008 scal accounts. There are four new scal indexes, comprising
three ow indexes and one stock index. These new indexes target not only
ordinary accounts in each municipality but also extra-governmental orga-
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nizations to reveal the true scal conditions of the public sector. Before
the new scal rule was introduced, the scal management of all municipali-
ties had been conducted under the former rule for approximately 50 years.
Because the former rule included only one of the indexes relating to real
decits of ordinary accounts as a target, some municipalities were able to
easily shift a part of the scal decits of their ordinary accounts to extra-
governmental organizations to hide bad municipal scal conditions. For
example, Yubari city in Hokkaido went practically bankrupt in 2007. This
event was in fact due to creative accounting between the ordinary accounts
and extra-governmental organizations, such as third sector enterprises. Be-
cause Yubari city transferred large debts, which they had to repay, to other
accounts, it accumulated debts approximately 65 times as large as its tax
revenue prior to bankruptcy.
Fig. 1 presents the new scal indexes for measuring the degree of mu-
nicipal scal soundness3. The real decit (RD) ratio is the ratio of the real
decit of ordinary accounts to the standard nancial scale of municipalities
as a ow index.
Real deficit ratio =
real deficit
standard financial scale
(1)
The standard nancial scale includes the general revenues of municipal-
ities for each scal year, which consist of standard local tax revenues and
Local Allocation Tax grants (LAT grants) from the central government. An
LAT grant is a lump-sum, unspecic grant for local governments. The num-
ber of LAT grants provided to each municipality is determined by the central
government based on municipal scal shortages for each scal year4. The
RD ratio targets only ordinary accounts, with nearly the same scope as the
former rule.
The consolidated real decit (CRD) ratio is the ratio of the consolidated
real decit of ordinary accounts and public enterprise accounts to the stan-
dard nancial scale of municipalities as a ow index.
Consolidated real deficit ratio =
consolidated real deficit
standard financial scale
(2)
The CRD ratio targets ordinary accounts and public enterprise accounts.
Under the former rule, we were able to check only bad debts for each public
enterprise. Although municipalities practically manage each public enter-
3In this section, we refer to the "White Paper on Local Public Finance, 2007" by the
Ministry of Internal Aairs and Communications.
4For further information on the LAT grant system, see Ihori (2009), Saito and Yunoue
(2009), and Hirota and Yunoue (2017).
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prise, it was dicult to conrm the relationship between ordinary accounts
and public enterprise accounts.
The real debt service (RDS) ratio is the ratio of the bond redemption
amount of ordinary accounts, public enterprise accounts, partial administra-
tive associations, and wide-area local public bodies to the standard nancial
scale of municipalities as a ow index.
Real debt service ratio =
redemption of bond
standard financial scale
(3)
The RDS ratio targets ordinary accounts and wide-area local public bod-
ies, showing how much debt the municipalities have to repay each year 5.
However, the RDS ratio is calculated by excluding specic grants from the
numerator of the index. Therefore, if municipalities increase the number of
specic grants they are awarded, they can reduce their RDS ratios.
The future burden (FB) ratio is the ratio of the current outstanding
balance of burden, including that of the debts of the local general account
as well as other likely future payments, and represents the extent to which
nances may be tight in the future.
Future burden ratio =
future burden
standard financial scale
(4)
The FB ratio targets all public sector entities in each municipality. The
numerator of the FB ratio consists of accumulated debts in ordinary ac-
counts and the debt burdens of extra-governmental organizations as a stock
variable. Thus, if municipalities have a large debt burden in third-sector
enterprise accounts, their FB ratios rise. However, the FB ratio is calcu-
lated by excluding the estimated amount of specic grants and appropriable
funds, including reserved funds and others, from the numerator of the in-
dex. Therefore, if municipalities increase their specic grants or decrease
their reserved funds, they can reduce their FB ratios.
In addition to the new four indexes, we dene the reserved funds (RF)
ratio for the repayment of bonds for each municipality. The RF ratio is ob-
tained by dividing the total amount of reserved funds by the population size6
because municipalities can decrease their RD and CRD ratios by reducing
funds reserved for the repayment of bonds while allowing for an increase in
their FB ratios, which do not include a red card.
Fig. 2 presents a diagram of the nancial status of local governments.
5If the RDS ratio of a municipality exceeds 18 percent, the municipality needs to obtain
permission to issue new bonds from the central government after applying the new scal
rule.
6The total reserved fund gures are in thousands of Japanese yen in this paper.
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The new scal rule establishes four new indexes and requires local gov-
ernments to disclose them thoroughly with the aim of quickly achieving
nancial soundness or rebuilding. The four new indexes include a num-
ber of nancial criteria: for example, if municipalities exceed RD ratios of
between 11.25 and 15 percent, depending on the nancial size of the munici-
pality, they are within the early nancial soundness restoration stage (yellow
card) and must improve their scal conditions by themselves. In this case,
municipalities must formulate a nancial soundness plan approved by local
councils and conduct a mandatory external audit. Additionally, munici-
palities must report on their implementation progress to local councils and
via public announcements every scal year. If the early achievement of -
nancial soundness is deemed to be very dicult, the Minister for Internal
Aairs and Communications or the prefectural governor makes necessary
recommendations. All four indexes include a yellow card.
Moreover, if municipalities exceed an RD ratio of 20 percent, they are
within the nancial rebuilding stage (red card) and must be scally man-
aged under the surveillance of the central government. These municipalities
must perform a thorough nancial rebuilding with the involvement of the
central government. In this case, municipalities must formulate a nan-
cial rebuilding plan approved by local councils and conduct a mandatory
external audit. Additionally, municipalities must obtain agreement on the
nancial rebuilding plan in consultation with the Minister for Internal Af-
fairs and Communications. The criteria for the CRD, RDS, and FB ratios
are determined by the new scal rule. Although the FB ratio includes a
yellow card, for which the criteria is 350 percent, it does not include a red
card.
3 Empirical framework
3.1 Estimation method
In this section, we investigate the interdependency of the new scal indexes
in the new scal rule to reveal creative accounting by stock-ow adjustment
in Japanese municipalities. Technically, an SUR model can better address
contemporaneous correlations between the error terms in the interdepen-
dency of these indexes compared to the methods employed in previous stud-
ies. This advantage is because each index is interdependently determined
by each municipality at the same time and because each municipality has to
continue watching both the stock and ow indexes to avoid exceeding each
criteria. However, since the FB ratio index does not include a red card, mu-
nicipalities may decide to decrease their RD or CRD ratios while allowing
an increase in their FB ratios.
The Japanese local public nance system is practically centralized and
is highly dependent on grants from the central government. For example,
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in FY2008, 1647 out of a total of 1788 municipalities received LAT grants.
Municipalities follow the principle of a single annual budget every year. The
expenditures for each scal year have to be nanced by the revenues from
that scal year. If municipalities do not spend all of their budgets within the
scal year, grants such as LAT grants or specic grants can be reduced in the
following scal year. The public project expenditures of some municipalities
have a tendency to increase at the end of the scal year. We can consider
the relationship between ordinary accounts and extra-governmental organi-
zations and that between stock and ow indexes simultaneously by applying
an SUR model. Equation (5) presents an estimation model.
Yij =0 + pop;jln(Popi) + pop2;jln(Popi)
2 + area;jln(Areai)
+ Sgrants;jSgrantsi;t 1 + LAT;jLATgrantsi;t 1
+ Mergedtrend;jMergedtrendi + Citysize;jCitysizei + ij
(5)
where i represents municipalities and j represents the scal indexes. The
dependent variables, Yij , consist of RDi, CRDi, RDSi, and FBi. We use
RFi, which is the funds reserved per capita for the repayment of bonds
in each municipality as a dependent variable because municipalities can
decrease their RD and CRD ratios by reducing the amount of funds reserved
for the repayment of bonds while allowing an increase in their FB ratios,
which does not include a red card. 0 is a constant, and the error terms are
ij . We assume that the error terms for each equation have contemporaneous
correlations because of decisions stemming from the scal indexes.
The independent variables consist of ln(Popi), the square of ln(Popi),
ln(Areai), Sgrantsi;t 1, LATgrantsi;t 1, andMergedtrendi. Mergedtrendi
is the number of years after a municipal merger because the number of mu-
nicipalities rapidly decreased through municipal mergers between FY1999
and FY2006.
Sgrantsi;t 1 and LATgrantsi;t 1 are the ratios of grants to total rev-
enues. t is a time period. We specically focus on both Sgrantsi;t 1 and
LATgrantsi;t 1, rst because Japanese municipalities have been highly de-
pendent on certain specic and LAT grants from the central government for
about 50 years. Japanese municipalities have little right to impose their own
local taxes as the system is centralized. Most local tax rates are determined
by the central government for obtaining horizontal scal equity among mu-
nicipalities. Therefore, the tax capacity of municipalities depends on their
population size or area. The second reason that we focus on these grants is
because the new scal indexes include the standard nancial scale in their
denominators. The standard nancial scale consists of ordinary revenues,
such as local tax revenues and LAT grants. Thus, when municipalities re-
ceive larger LAT grants than usual, their new scal indexes can decrease.
Moreover, the numerators of the RDS and FB ratios are calculated by elimi-
nating the amount of revenue from specic grants. Thus, we have to consider
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the eects of both specic and LAT grants on the new scal indexes in our
estimation.
The Citysizei dummy variables consist of an ordinance-designated cities
dummy, a core cities dummy, a special case cities dummy, and a cities
dummy. Because these cities provide dierent types of public services de-
pending on their size, we have to consider city size in our estimation. Specif-
ically, the yellow card FB ratio criterion for ordinance-designated cities is
400 percent, while that of other cities is 350 percent.
3.2 Data and summary statistics
In the SUR model, we use Japanese municipal data from FY2008 to FY2010
because the new scal rule has been in force since FY20087. In FY2008, the
new scal rule was enforced, and 2, 2, 20, and 3 municipalities were classi-
ed into the early nancial soundness stages (the yellow card) of the RD,
CRD, RDS, and FB ratio indexes, respectively. In FY2009, 0, 0, 12, and
3 municipalities and 0, 0, 4, and 2 municipalities in FY2010 were classied
into the early nancial soundness stages of the RD, CRD, RDS, and FB
ratio indexes, respectively. The data on municipal governments are derived
primarily from the Shi Cyo Son Kessan Jyokyo (Statistics of the Final Ac-
counts of Municipal Governments), Zaisei Jyokyo tou Ichiran hyo (Municipal
Financial Situation list) and the Gappei Digital Archive (Digital Archive of
Municipal Mergers).
Summary statistics are reported in Table 1. In this paper, the RD and
CRD ratios are multiplied by -1. When the RD and CRD ratios have a
surplus, they are positive, and when they have a decit, they are negative.
We excluded the data for Yubari city in our estimation because the city
went practically bankrupt before the introduction of the new scal rule8.
The mean RD ratio values gradually increased to 4.5 in FY2008, 5.2 in
FY2009 and 5.9 in FY2010. The mean CRD ratio values increased to 15 in
FY2008, 15.6 in FY2009, and 16.6 in FY2010. In other words, we can see
that real decits improved not only in ordinary accounts but also in public
enterprise accounts for the period. Likewise, the mean RDS ratio values
gradually decreased to 14.2 in FY2008, 13.4 in FY2009 and 12.4 in FY2010.
Mean FB ratio values also decreased to 89.8 in FY2008, 77 in FY2009 and
59.2 in FY2010. All indexes improved on average for the period. However,
we suspect that municipalities control these indexes to avoid exceeding the
7To properly evaluate the eects of the new scal rule, we did not use data after
FY2011 because a number of municipalities were severely damaged by the Great East
Japan Earthquake on 11 March, 2011. In the following years, these municipalities received
many kinds of support, including a large number of special grants issued by the central
government and others. Therefore, we decided to drop the data after FY2011 in this paper
to avoid the eects of the earthquake.
8The FB ratio of Yubari city was more than 1,000 percent for a few years.
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index criteria. Thus, we try to estimate the interdependency of the new scal
indexes by using an SUR model to address the contemporaneous correlation.
4 Empirical results
4.1 Estimation results using an SUR model
Table 2 - 4 shows the results of the estimation using an SUR model for the
period from FY2008 to FY2010. Per the results of the Breusch-Pagan test,
we rejected the hypothesis that the error term correlations are zero for the
study period. The error terms are correlated for each equation, indicating
that we would achieve more eective statistical results with an SUR model
than with an OLS model. Additionally, we nd that the results for FY2008
to FY2010 are very similar in each scal year.
For the RD ratios from FY2008 to FY2010, the population size coe-
cients are signicant with negative signs. The coecients for the square of
the population size are signicant with positive signs9. Thus, small munic-
ipalities have small scal surpluses, while large municipalities have larger
scal surpluses. The coecients for municipal area are signicant with neg-
ative signs. Municipalities with large areas have small scal surpluses. The
specic and LAT grants coecients are signicant with negative signs; that
is, the RD ratios of municipalities that receive a large number of grants from
the central government is small. The merger coecient is signicant with a
positive sign. Merged municipalities improved their scal decits following
municipal mergers. The city size dummy variables are not signicant.
For the CRD ratios, the population size coecients are signicant, but
they have the opposite sign as those for the RD ratio. Using the CRD ra-
tio, the coecients for population size have positive signs and those for the
square of the population size have negative signs. When we include the scal
decits of public enterprise accounts, we nd that small municipalities have
large scal surpluses while large municipalities have small scal surpluses.
This nding means that larger municipalities tend to have large public en-
terprises, such as transport businesses and public hospitals. Thus, scal
surpluses for large municipalities are small. The coecients for specic and
LAT grants are signicant with negative signs for the CRD ratios as well
as the RD ratios. For both RD and CRD ratios, these results indicate that
these grants cause a ypaper eect or a soft budget problem10. Addition-
ally, it is natural that the coecients for LAT grants have negative signs
because the denominators of the RD and CRD ratios consist of the standard
nancial scale, which includes both local tax revenue and LAT grants.
9Note that our RD and CRD ratios are multiplied by -1.
10Kakamu et al. (2014) revealed the ypaper eects for Japanese prefectural government
expenditures.
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For the RDS ratios, the population size coecients are signicant with
positive signs, and those of the square of the population size are signicant
with negative signs. When the area of municipalities is large, the RDS ratio
is large because the area coecients have positive signs. For the RDS ratio,
the LAT grant coecients are signicant with positive signs. Therefore,
municipalities that receive more LAT grants suer from large accumulated
debts that they must repay each year. The merger coecient is signi-
cant with a positive sign. The merged municipalities increased the RDS
ratio. The ordinance-designated cities dummy variables are signicant with
positive signs. The city size dummy variables are signicant with negative
signs. However, the city size dummy variables in FY2010 are positive and
signicant.
For the FB ratios, the population size coecients are signicant with
positive signs ,and those of the square of the population size are signicant
with negative signs. The LAT grant coecients are signicant with positive
signs. Therefore, because municipalities that heavily depend on LAT grants
from the central government suer from a large amount of accumulated
debt, they have larger FB ratios than others. Among the city size dummy
variables, those for ordinance-designated cities, core cities, and special case
cities are signicant with positive signs. The city size dummy variables in
FY2008 and FY2009 are signicant with negative signs, but that in FY2010
is signicant with a positive sign.
Given these results for the new scal indexes, we consider the estima-
tion result of the per capita RF. Both the coecients for population size
and the square of population size are signicant. When the population size
of a municipality increases, its RF ratio decreases. Large municipalities
have larger RF ratios than others. The coecients for city area are signif-
icant with positive signs. Moreover, the coecients for specic grants in
FY2008 and FY2009 are signicant with a positive sign. This result indi-
cates that municipalities with a large number of specic grants have larger
RF ratios. However, the same coecients in FY2010 are not signicant.
The coecients for LAT grants are signicant with negative signs because
municipalities that receive a large number of LAT grants from the central
government cannot aord to reserve their funds. The merger coecient is
positive and signicant. In the city size dummy variables, we can see dier-
ent results for the new scal indexes. We revealed that the coecients for
ordinance-designated cities, core cities, and special case cities are signicant
with negative signs, indicating that these large cities avoided exceeding the
criteria of the new scal indexes, especially those of the ow indexes, by
reducing their reserved funds. As a result, their FB ratios increased while
their RF ratios decreased.
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4.2 Interdependency of the new scal indexes
In this section, we investigate the interdependency between the new scal
indexes and reserved funds using the correlation matrix of the residuals
from the SUR model. Using this correlation matrix, we can conrm the re-
lationship between ordinary accounts and extra-governmental organization
accounts. We specically focus on stock-ow adjustments among these in-
dexes. Table 5 shows the correlation matrix of the residuals from the SUR
model for the data from FY2008 to FY2010.
Naturally, the RD and CRD ratios have strongly positive correlations
between FY2008 and FY2010. We reveal that the real decits of ordinary
accounts and public enterprise accounts improved in this period. A nega-
tive correlation is observed between the the RD and RDS ratios, showing
that municipalities that improved their real decits reduced their debt re-
payments to improve their scal soundness. However, the RD and FB ratios
have negative correlations of -0.182 in FY2008, -0.114 in FY2009, and -0.052
in FY2010. In other words, municipalities were willing to increase their FB
ratios, which is the stock index, just after the introduction of the new scal
rule, in turn decreasing their RD ratios, one of the ow indexes. We also nd
that municipalities made stock-ow adjustments by reducing their reserved
funds because the RD and RF ratios have a slightly negative correlation in
addition to the estimation results of the SUR model in Table 2 - 4. These
correlations between the RD ratio and other indexes between FY2008 and
FY2010 are statistically signicant per a test of the correlation coecients.
Next, we focus on the relationship between the CRD ratio and the other
indexes. We reveal a negative correlation between the CRD and FB ratios
between FY2008 and FY2010, the same as the correlation between the RD
and FB ratios. This result indicates that municipalities increased their FB
ratios to reduce their CRD ratios and reduced their RF ratios to decrease
their CRD ratios.
The correlation between the RDS and FB ratios is strongly positive.
Municipalities that have a large amount of accumulated debt must repay
their debt each year. Additionally, the RDS and RF ratios have a negative
correlation, showing that it is not easy to reserve additional funds each
year because municipalities have to repay a large amount of debt that they
borrowed before the implementation of the new scal rule.
Finally, we reveal a strongly negative correlation between the FB and
RF ratios of approximately -0.5 between FY2008 and FY2010. These results
indicate that municipalities create stock-ow adjustments by reducing their
reserved funds to improve their real decits while they ignore increases in
their FB ratios.
From both of these results in Table 5 and the estimation results in Tables
2 - 4, we can reveal that large municipalities, which are specic kinds of
cities, including ordinance-designated cities, core cities, and special case
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cities, adjusted their scal indexes to avoid exceeding the criteria established
by the new scal rule. The reason for this behavior is that municipalities
did not want to be scally managed under the surveillance of the central
government and wanted to avoid reductions in their LAT grants from the
central government. We conclude that municipalities implemented stock-
ow adjustments to the extent permitted by the new scal rule to avoid
these situations.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we contribute to this literature in several ways. We analyzed
creative accounting by stock-ow adjustment after the introduction of the
new scal rule in Japanese municipalities. Our primary contribution is that
we focused on the interdependency of the new scal indexes of new scal rule
by applying an SUR model, a method that is dierent from those employed
in previous studies.
First, using an SUR model, we revealed that the ow indexes of the mu-
nicipalities that depend on specic and LAT grants from the central govern-
ment exhibited increased real decits for both ordinary accounts and public
enterprise accounts. This nding indicates that the ypaper eect and soft
budget problem are caused by the large number of grants awarded by the
central government. Moreover, the stock indexes of large municipalities that
depend on LAT grants are higher than those of other municipalities. Speci-
cally, the stock indexes of large municipalities that are ordinance-designated
cities, core cities, or special case cities are higher than those of other mu-
nicipalities. Municipalities that receive a large number of specic grants
reserve their funds. However, municipalities that receive a large number of
LAT grants have smaller amounts of reserved funds than other municipali-
ties. Additionally, large municipalities, which include ordinance-designated
cities, core cities, and special case cities, have smaller amounts of reserved
funds.
Second, we revealed an interdependency between the new scal indexes
of the new scal rule using a correlation matrix of the residuals. The ow
indexes and stock index have a negative correlation. This result shows that
municipalities create stock-ow adjustments in which they allow increases in
the stock index while decreasing their ow indexes by reducing their reserved
funds to avoid exceeding the criteria of the new scal rule. Specically, we
found that large municipalities implemented stock-ow adjustments because
they had larger amounts of reserved funds than towns and villages.
Therefore, we believe that municipalities myopically postponed solving
their scal problems even though the aim of introducing the new scal rule
was to achieve true scal soundness and to prevent stock-ow adjustments
between ordinary accounts and extra-governmental organizations. Given
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that a number of municipalities depend on a large number of grants from
the central government and that they have a large amount of accumulated
debt, we conclude that municipalities implemented stock-ow adjustments
by reducing their reserved funds after the introduction of the new scal rule.
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Figure 1: Subject of ratio for determining soundness
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Figure 2: Image of sound nancial status of local governments
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Table 1: Summary statistics
FY2008
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
RD 4.503 3.266 -16.31 29.56
CRD 15.032 11.280 -26.42 116.06
RDS 14.193 5.034 -0.3 32.1
FB 89.830 83.430 -392.883 393.511
RF 195.458 363.571 0.187 5260.392
ln(Pop) 10.080 1.416 5.056 15.0981
ln(Area) 4.701 1.224 1.244 7.686
Specic grants 0.073 0.041 0.000 0.413
LAT grants 0.257 0.161 0 0.649
Merged trend 1.439 2.152 0 10
Designated cities 0.010 0.097 0 1
Core cities 0.022 0.147 0 1
Special case cities 0.024 0.152 0 1
Cities 0.382 0.486 0 1
FY2009
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
RD 5.119 3.559 -10.31 42.49
CRD 15.604 11.275 -14.02 104.31
RDS 13.432 4.840 -0.2 28.4
FB 77.029 81.962 -442.842 372.562
RF 212.616 400.109 1.460 5540.666
ln(Pop) 10.101 1.432 5.106 15.102
ln(Area) 4.735 1.223 1.244 7.686
Specic grants 0.087 0.042 0.001 0.434
LAT grants 0.265 0.165 0 0.619
Merged trend 1.790 2.609 0 11
Designated cities 0.010 0.102 0 1
Core cities 0.024 0.152 0 1
Special case cities 0.023 0.151 0 1
Cities 0.394 0.489 0 1
FY2010
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
RD 5.857 3.958 -9.56 35
CRD 16.631 11.413 -8.54 117.83
RDS 12.365 4.541 -3.1 26.2
FB 59.186 80.851 -492.446 383.067
RF 244.847 441.706 0.895 6398.282
ln(Pop) 10.093 1.436 5.136 15.104
ln(Area) 4.736 1.223 1.244 7.686
Specic grants 0.140 0.038 0.015 0.352
LAT grants 0.247 0.148 0 0.565
Merged trend 2.130 3.065 0 12
Designated cities 0.011 0.104 0 1
Core cities 0.023 0.151 0 1
Special case cities 0.023 0.151 0 1
Cities 0.394 0.489 0 1
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Table 2: Estimation results
FY2008
Variables RD CRD RDS FB RF
ln(Pop) -3.032*** 12.132*** 3.915*** 173.085*** -1,413.656***
(0.693) (2.521) (0.964) (17.150) (57.256)
ln(Pop)*2 0.097*** -0.641*** -0.230*** -7.595*** 59.277***
(0.037) (0.136) (0.052) (0.923) (3.082)
ln(Area) -0.252*** -0.003 0.589*** 0.909 53.805***
(0.078) (0.283) (0.108) (1.927) (6.435)
Specic grants (lag) -9.882*** -40.144*** -0.161 -71.618 1,080.486***
(1.924) (7.000) (2.678) (47.617) (158.977)
LAT grants (lag) -6.763*** -18.245*** 12.549*** 213.758*** -940.290***
(0.738) (2.687) (1.028) (18.277) (61.019)
Mergers trend 0.228*** 0.104 0.209*** -0.288 22.796***
(0.041) (0.148) (0.056) (1.004) (3.353)
Designated cities -1.583 4.664 6.196*** 159.620*** -495.265***
(1.103) (4.014) (1.535) (27.304) (91.157)
Core cities 0.126 2.974 0.167 28.226* -216.946***
(0.645) (2.347) (0.898) (15.968) (53.313)
Special case cities -0.677 0.916 0.868 31.603** -126.649***
(0.557) (2.025) (0.775) (13.778) (45.999)
Cities -0.099 0.807 -0.951*** -21.607*** -23.588
(0.257) (0.935) (0.358) (6.362) (21.239)
Constant 28.450*** -34.756*** -6.369 -890.270*** 8,228.239***
(3.218) (11.710) (4.479) (79.658) (265.948)
Breusch-Pagan test Chi2(10) = 1662.659 ***
Observations 1,763 1,763 1,763 1,763 1,763
R-squared 0.165 0.076 0.322 0.220 0.543
Notes: ***, **, and * indicate statistical signicance at the 1, 5, and 10
percent level, respectively. Standard errors are reported in brackets.
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Table 3: Estimation results
FY2009
Variables RD CRD RDS FB RF
ln(Pop) -3.102*** 11.290*** 6.205*** 190.641*** -1,588.658***
(0.758) (2.518) (0.933) (16.544) (62.529)
ln(Pop)*2 0.095** -0.614*** -0.333*** -8.308*** 66.993***
(0.041) (0.136) (0.050) (0.891) (3.367)
ln(Area) -0.250*** -0.141 0.486*** 0.948 56.520***
(0.087) (0.289) (0.107) (1.898) (7.174)
Specic grants (lag) -6.533*** -38.357*** 1.116 -28.243 650.763***
(2.094) (6.957) (2.578) (45.708) (172.758)
LAT grants (lag) -6.458*** -18.188*** 12.597*** 200.228*** -986.088***
(0.813) (2.702) (1.001) (17.753) (67.099)
Mergers trend 0.229*** 0.046 0.147*** -1.033 23.084***
(0.037) (0.124) (0.046) (0.815) (3.081)
Designated cities -1.618 4.423 7.574*** 156.946*** -542.543***
(1.158) (3.846) (1.425) (25.271) (95.515)
Core cities 0.074 4.119* 0.683 31.283** -236.179***
(0.709) (2.355) (0.872) (15.469) (58.468)
Special case cities -0.254 0.751 0.822 24.896* -135.853***
(0.633) (2.103) (0.779) (13.819) (52.231)
Cities 0.028 0.285 -0.965*** -18.503*** -41.409*
(0.284) (0.942) (0.349) (6.189) (23.393)
Constant 29.579*** -26.482** -19.159*** -1,010.949*** 9,258.860***
(3.530) (11.728) (4.345) (77.051) (291.223)
Breusch-Pagan test Chi2(10) = 1622.225 ***
Observations 1,697 1,697 1,697 1,697 1,697
R-squared 0.155 0.076 0.316 0.252 0.552
Notes: ***, **, and * indicate statistical signicance at the 1, 5, and 10
percent level, respectively. Standard errors are reported in brackets.
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Table 4: Estimation results
FY2010
Variables RD CRD RDS FB RF
ln(Pop) -3.271*** 10.562*** 6.932*** 192.483*** -1,820.131***
(0.837) (2.537) (0.883) (15.864) (65.815)
ln(Pop)*2 0.094** -0.570*** -0.357*** -8.289*** 77.750***
(0.045) (0.137) (0.048) (0.854) (3.544)
ln(Area) -0.445*** -0.262 0.381*** 1.277 54.150***
(0.097) (0.294) (0.102) (1.838) (7.626)
Specic grants (lag) -6.553*** -23.939*** -1.322 -8.389 65.737
(2.389) (7.241) (2.520) (45.278) (187.842)
LAT grants (lag) -6.404*** -18.861*** 13.535*** 209.734*** -1,075.453***
(1.023) (3.100) (1.079) (19.386) (80.426)
Mergers trend 0.226*** 0.053 0.077** -1.862*** 22.947***
(0.035) (0.107) (0.037) (0.670) (2.780)
Designated cities -0.743 1.801 8.304*** 159.578*** -584.509***
(1.405) (4.259) (1.482) (26.633) (110.491)
Core cities 0.359 2.677 2.189** 48.012*** -201.099***
(0.919) (2.784) (0.969) (17.410) (72.229)
Special case cities 0.297 -0.020 1.884** 37.567** -102.005
(0.807) (2.445) (0.851) (15.286) (63.418)
Cities 0.502 -0.480 0.924*** 16.222*** 62.115**
(0.314) (0.952) (0.331) (5.954) (24.702)
Constant 33.017*** -21.479* -26.227*** -1,085.056*** 10,475.681***
(3.975) (12.047) (4.192) (75.327) (312.502)
Breusch-Pagan test Chi2(10) = 1638.718 ***
Observations 1,722 1,722 1,722 1,722 1,722
R-squared 0.153 0.065 0.285 0.271 0.581
Notes: ***, **, and * indicate statistical signicance at the 1, 5, and 10
percent level, respectively. Standard errors are reported in brackets.
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Table 5: Correlation matrix of residuals
FY2008
RD CRD RDS FB RF
RD 1.000
CRD 0.389*** 1.000
RDS -0.161*** -0.039 1.000
FB -0.182*** -0.143*** 0.648*** 1.000
RF -0.062** -0.058 -0.212*** -0.492*** 1.000
FY2009
RD CRD RDS FB RF
RD 1.000
CRD 0.409*** 1.000
RDS -0.137*** -0.041 1.000
FB -0.114*** -0.1*** 0.66*** 1.000
RF -0.124*** -0.04* -0.195*** -0.505*** 1.000
FY2010
RD CRD RDS FB RF
RD 1.000
CRD 0.437*** 1.000
RDS -0.069*** -0.033 1.000
FB -0.052** -0.066*** 0.662*** 1.000
RF -0.13*** -0.041* -0.1867*** -0.506*** 1.000
Notes: ***, **, and * indicate statistical signicance at the 1, 5, and 10
percent level, respectively. Standard errors are reported in brackets.
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